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Abstract. The discourse that has developed so far around Islamic 
theology includes the emergence of dominant theological currents due 
to political factors. Yet if it is explored more in-depth, freedom of 
thought (tafakkur) is one of the main factors. Based on this 
understanding, two issues need to be discussed in this paper: First, how 
are the various methods and patterns of thought that develop in the 
realms of Islamic theology; Second, what issues are the subject of debate 
in the realms of Islamic theology. The discussion is carried out by 
descriptive analysis based on relevant sources that are not limited in 
number. The discussion results show that the thought processes carried 
out by kalam scholars (mutakallimīn) have had a significant influence 
on the growth and development of Islamic theology. The arguments of 
the mind that were fertilized by Greek philosophy and other 
civilizations also played an important role in developing Islamic 
theology. Besides, the formation of more dominant schools is due to the 
different methods of thinking in explaining God, His oneness, and His 
attributes. 
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Abstrak. Diskursus yang berkembang selama ini seputar teologi Islam di 
antaranya bahwa munculnya aliran-aliran teologi dominannya 
disebabkan faktor politik. Padahal jika ditelusuri lebih dalam faktor 
kebebasan berpikir (tafakkur) merupakan salah satu faktor utamanya. 
Berdasarkan pemahaman tersebut, ada dua persoalan yang perlu 
dibahas dalam tulisan ini, yaitu: Pertama, bagaimana ragam metode dan 
corak pemikiran yang berkembang dalam khazanah teologi Islam; 
Kedua, persoalan apa saja yang menjadi bahan perdebatan dalam 
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khazanah teologi Islam. Pembahasannya dilakukan secara deskriptif 
analisis dengan berpijak pada sumber-sumber relevan yang tidak 
dibatasi jumlahnya. Hasil dari pembahasan menunjukkan bahwa proses 
kegiatan berpikir yang dilakukan oleh para ulama kalam (mutakallimīn) 
telah memberi pengaruh signifikan dalam pertumbuhan dan 
perkembangan teologi Islam. Dalil-dalil akal pikiran yang dipersubur 
oleh filsafat Yunani dan peradaban-peradaban lainnya juga berperan 
penting dalam mengembangkan teologi Islam. Di samping itu, 
terbentuknya aliran-aliran lebih dominan disebabkan perbedaan 
metode berpikir dalam memberikan penjelasan tentang Tuhan, 
keesaan, dan sifatNya. 
 
Kata Kunci: Teologi Islam, Tafakkur, Metode Berpikir 
 
Introduction 
n studying Islamic theology arguments originating from the al-Qur’an, a 
particular method is needed to capture the messages. For this purpose, 
classical scholars use ‘ilm al-kalām or Islamic theology as a method to 
study these arguments. On the other hand, there is a philosophy and logic used 
by some classical scholars as weapons to fend off the attacks of their opponents, 
namely Atheists, Jews, Christians, and Magi. They always shake the beliefs of 
Muslims by using the same weapons. Philosophy and logic then became the first 
basis for studying Islamic theology. In the realm of Islamic theology, Mu‘tazilah 
is a school that includes elements and philosophical methods. Mu‘tazilah was 
much influenced by Greek philosophy, which entered the Islamic world at the 
end of the Umayyad reign and developed rapidly during the Bani ‘Abbasids. 
Therefore, Mu‘tazilah teachings are known to be rational and liberal. At the 
peak of its development, Mu‘tazilah received the support of the Caliph al-
Ma‘mun, the ‘Abbasid ruler who ruled 813-833 AD and made it the official sect or 
school of the state (Nurdin and Abbas, 2012, 9). 
The increasingly strong influence of Greek philosophy into Islamic religious 
thought, Mu‘tazilah teachings grew. However, one of the theologians who were 
initially been followers of the Mu‘tazilah, namely Abu Hasan al-Asy’ari, 
surprisingly expressed his departure and conveyed his theological teachings 
contrary to Mu‘tazilah. The name of the theological stream is attributed to his 
name, namely al-Ash‘ariyyah or followers of al-Asy’ary. In contrast to the 
Mu‘tazilah sect, which is rationalistic in style, Abu Hasan al-Ash‘ariyah in his 
theological viewpoint mostly adopts the sunnah of the Prophet Muḥammad 
through hadith texts (Nasution, 1986, 62-65). At the same time, in Persia, a 
theological school founded by Abū Manṣur Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn 
I 
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Maḥmūd al-Māturīdī, known as the Maturidiyyah school. Except in a few cases, 
Maturidiyah religious understanding is not much different from Ash‘ariyyah 
account (Nasution, 1986, 62-65). Because of this, Maturidiyah is classified as 
Ahlu as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā’ah along with Ash‘ariyyah. 
Muslims at that time were divided into several groups (firqah) theology, 
which put forward religious arguments to defend the stand of their respective 
groups. From here, the science of Islamic theology continues to develop. It 
discusses various problems related to divinity, grave sins, faith and infidelity, 
reason and revelation, human actions, etc. The emergence of multiple streams 
of theology in Islam is a consequence that must occur as a result of lively 
thinking activities among ‘ulama’. To understand the methods and patterns of 
thought of the scholars in theological issues, it can be seen, for example, how 
different views are quite diverse about the concept of divinity (Hanafi, 1979, 11). 
Based on the guidance of naṣ (al-Qur’an and hadith), all Muslims believe that 
the Islamic divinity is monotheism (Q.S. al-Ikhlash/112: 1-4). However, in 
empirical reality, teachings about the One God gave birth to various views and 
theological concepts. So, even though God as the object of belief in Muslims is 
the same, namely Allah, when it is responded to and understood by many 
individual Muslims, these teachings give birth to various divine concepts. Some 
think that God has nature, and some think that they don’t. Some teachings or 
views argue that God possess absolute power over human actions, whereas 
some views argue the opposite. Some of them think that Allah can be seen with 
their eyes in the hereafter, and some have different opinions. 
The emergence of opinions on various theological problems is motivated by 
the various paradigms and methods of thinking of Islamic theological schools in 
describing the object of study. For example, the Mu‘tazilah group gives freedom 
to do and think to humans as a manifestation of God’s justice (Nasr, 1996, 9-10). 
This group is also known as a group that relies heavily on reason. So, that if naṣ 
are found to be mut worried against reason, then, the intention of naṣ must be 
rationalized so that it is following reason. Meanwhile, in Ash‘ariyah, Abū Ḥasan 
al-Ash‘arī took a middle path between the two extremes: namely the Mu‘tazili 
rationalists who put the position of revelation under reasoning, and the 
externalists who ultimately rejected the role of reasoning. In general, Ash‘ariyah 
makes reasoning subject to revelation and also leaves human free will (Nasr, 
1996, 11-12). Meanwhile, Maturidiyah gave more authority or ability to reason to 
know Allah and know good or bad actions (Zahrah, 1986, 79-93). 
This point is understood that the methods of thinking in Islamic theology 
can be categorized into two types, namely rational and traditional. Thus, 
studying Islamic theological schools is an attempt to understand the thinking 
methods and decision-making processes of the mutakallimīn (Muslim 
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theologians) in solving theological problems (Razak and Anwar, 2000, 31). 
Departing from the above frameworks of thought, the author is interested in 
discussing abour the various methods and patterns of thought in the realms of 
Islamic theology. The question posed is what the forms of methods and ways of 
thought that have developed in Islamic theology are? The discussion is carried 
out in a descriptive analysis based on the relative number of sources. 
 
Discourse on the ‘Ilm al-Kalam and Islamic Theology 
Before discussing the various methods and patterns of thought in Islamic 
theology, we first describe some of the problems related to the term “Islamic 
theology” and its meaning. This issue is among the issues that are often the 
subject of discourse in the realms of contemporary Islamic theology. The term 
“theology” used in Islamic scholarship does not originate from the Islamic 
tradition. The mention of “Islamic theology” in Islamic scholarship is discussed 
in a popular discipline under the name ‘ilm al-kalām. The word “theology” is 
etymologically derived from Greek, namely “theology”, which consists of the 
word “theos,” which means “God” and “logos,” which means “knowledge” (Runes, 
ed., 1977, 293). So, etymologically, theology implies the knowledge of God or the 
science that talks about God. The term theology is the science that discusses 
God or knowledge of divinity (Arif, 2008, 46-47). However, from several other 
meanings, it can be concluded that theology has a broader meaning, namely 
talking about God and humans to God based on revealed information and based 
on the study and thought of a pure reason. 
The term “theology” is not a new treasure in the history of Islamic thought. 
This can be traced to the early days of Islam when there was an intellectual 
transformation through the translation of books of Greek philosophy. Greek 
philosophers monumental works such as “Aristotle’s Theology” and “Elementatio 
Theologia” were well known among Islamic thinkers. This intellectual 
transformation is quite reasonable given the dialectical interaction and the 
development of thought in Islamic civilization (Fakhri, 1983, 19-31). Therefore, 
theological terms as a substitute for the term ‘ilm al-kalām is nothing but a 
repetitive historical process (Wolfson, 1-2). From a sociolinguistic point of view, 
theological terms and ‘ilm al-kalām have the same nuance, namely knowledge 
that talks about God, who God is, where God comes from, where God is, and 
how His power. However, the theological naming for ‘ilm al-kalām has its 
problems. The mention of ‘ilm al-kalām in terms of Islamic theology has even 
become a polemic. There are at least two things that can be used as reasons why 
the term theology in the Islamic thought tradition contains polemics: 
First, the word “theos” in the teachings of all religions is a call to divine 
natures that are under God’s control, and each religion has different calls, for 
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example, “angel” (Islam), “angelos” (Christianity). “Mallak” (in Hebrew), “ahuras” 
(Zarathusra), “daivas” (Hinduism), “boddhisatvas” (Buddha), and others. The 
word “logia” in ancient Greek comes from “logos” which means reason, it can 
also mean doctrine or theory or science (Arif, 2008 46-47). In this sense, the 
word “theology” in the traditions of the previous religions is related to the 
science of religion as a whole and less relevant to ‘ilm al-kalām in Islamic 
religious knowledge. 
Second, the term theology in the Christian tradition talks about various 
issues related to religion, including how to organize society, interpret the Bible, 
and the mystical aspects of religion whereas in the Islamic tradition, matters 
related to law and interpretation and mysticism are studied in fiqh, tafsir and 
tasawwuf. The knowledge of God is studied in ‘ilm al-kalām. Therefore, Christian 
theology is different from ‘ilm al-kalām in Islam. However, the term theology in 
Islamic studies is often translated as ilm al-kalām, which is one of Islam’s 
traditional disciplines. At least two reasons why Islamic theology is called ‘ilm 
al-kalām. 
First, the naming of Islamic theology as ‘ilm al-kalām because of the many 
disputed issues is Kalām Allah (al-Qur’an). Taftāzānī, in his book Dirāsāt fi al-
Falsafah al-Islāmiyyah explains that this knowledge is called ‘ilm al-kalām 
because the first issue discussed in its history is about Kalām Allah (al-Qur’an), 
whether it is makhlūq (created), or qadīm (not completed), whether he is hadīth 
(new) or qadīm (eternal) (Taftāzānī, 1957, 4). Second, Harun Nasution, in his 
book Theologi Islam, views it from two perspectives: (1). The objective 
perspective, namely because what is discussed in this science, is the Kalām Allah 
(al-Qur’an), an issue which has caused stiff opposition among Muslims in the 
ninth and tenth centuries AD; (2). Subjective perspective, namely because 
mutakallimīn in their history, often used words or kalām in debates to defend 
their opinion and stand on religious issues (Nasution, 1986, ix). Whatever the 
reasons for its mention, ‘ilm al-kalām has historically been formulated as the 
rationalization of the Islamic creed through the search and formulation of 
rational arguments. In this context, ‘ilm al-kalām was born as an answer to and a 
challenge to the faith system outside of Islam which uses a philosophical 
rational method, either directly or indirectly, which is feared to have the goal of 
overthrowing the rationality of the Islamic creed (Syafi’i, 2012, 3). But are Islamic 
theology and ‘ilm al-kalām parallel terms and can be used as scientific 
substance? In this case, it still raises various discussions among the kalām 
scholars. 
Thus, there are at least two important things related to the similarity of the 
term of theology and ‘ilm al-kalām. Firstly, as long as what is meant is the 
definition of etymology, the likeness of the word ‘ilm al-kalām to theology’ can 
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be justified. Both of them direct the object of their study to the divine problem, 
and therefore their use can be mutually substituted. Second, the two terms 
similarity in the etymological sense does not necessarily indicate the similarity 
in the terminological and operational meanings. Therefore, some Islamic 
thinkers still refuse to use the term theology to refer to ‘ilm al-kalām. The reason 
for the rejection is due to the difference in the object of study between ‘ilm al-
kalām and theology in the Christian tradition. In the Christian tradition, 
theology describes God and explains other aspects of Christian teaching. For 
this reason, the rejection is based on differences in the scope of the object of 
study. On the other hand, those who accept the word “theology” as the 
equivalent of the word ‘ilm al-kalām, after understanding the sides of the 
differences between the two, add special requirements. Behind the word, 
“theology” must be added with the word “Islam.” According to Islamic 
intellectual traditions, this addition serves as a character and limitation of 
Islamic theology, not Christianity and others. 
In the classical Islamic scientific concept, another equivalent that can be 
articulated with theology is fiqh. The term fiqh at that time did not describe the 
object of study in the science of fiqh al-Islām as it is understood today, namely 
the issue of Islamic law, instead it was the beginning of the discipline of ‘ilm al-
kalām as the study conducted by Abū Ḥanīfah (Cook, 2000, 307-334). Abū 
Ḥanīfah wrote about al-Fiqh al-Akbar, which was not about the science of fiqh 
(Islamic law), but rather about the creed, which was the object of the discussion 
‘ilm al-kalām. It may be that the science of fiqh that discusses legal issues as is 
currently developing in Abū Ḥanīfah’s thinking is al-fiqh al-ashgar, while al-fiqh 
al-akbar is about Islamic creed. This is because ‘ilm al-kalām and fiqh science are 
both fiqh or systematized understanding. The first discussion is related to the 
uṣūliyyah field (regarding the principle or the main one), while the second is 
related to furū’iyyah (branches). However, the history and tradition of Islamic 
scholarship have eliminated the notion of fiqh used Abū Ḥanīfah (Effendi, 1995, 
52). 
Regarding the terminology of Islamic theology, there are many opinions and 
differences in understanding expressed by experts following the points of view 
and emphasis on certain aspects. Some experts emphasize the dimensions of 
the ontology or object of study, and others emphasize the epistemological or 
methodological aspects. There are also those who emphasize more on the 
axiological aspects. Among those that emphasize the dimension of ontology is 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh gives the definition (d. 1332 H / 1905 AD) who said that ‘ilm 
al-kalām or ‘ilm al-tawhīd is the science that discusses Allah, the obligatory 
qualities and those that are maybe established for Him, as well as what is 
mandatory to deny from Him, also discusses the Apostles to determine what is 
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obligatory, permissible, and forbidden to be attributed to them (‘Abduh, 1986, 
7). Harun Nasution also conveyed a similar definition that ‘ilm al-kalām or 
Islamic theology is a science that discusses Allah, His attributes, prophethood, 
nature, and God’s relationship with His creatures (Nasution, 1987, 28). In simple 
language, it can be said that the object of ‘ilm al-kalām or Islamic theology based 
on the ontology dimension includes” God and other objects of belief in Islamic 
creed (Wirman, 2013, 10, Madjid, 2008, 202). 
As for the notion of ‘ilm al-kalām or Islamic theology which emphasizes 
more epistemological and methodological aspects and sometimes also 
axiological aspects, among others are summarized in the formulation presented 
by ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ijī (756 H / 1355 AD), namely using the argument to refute 
fraud in matters of faith (Yusuf, 1990,3). Agreeing with the formulation of this 
definition, a Muslim scholar from Egypt Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Raziq cited various 
definitions, among which were conveyed by Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Tahawī that 
Islamic theology is “a science that provides the ability to establish Islamic beliefs 
by proposing argumentation and to dispel doubts (al-Raziq, 1959, 261). 
Furthermore, a definition that emphasizes more on the axiological aspects, 
among others, was conveyed by Ibn Khaldūn (d. 806 H / 106 AD) that ‘ilm al-
kalām or Islamic theology is “science which contains rational arguments to 
defend faiths, and rejects groups or bid‘ah experts who deviate or deviate from 
the understanding of the salaf and ahl al-sunnah (Khaldun, tt., 326). This 
definition is almost the same as the formula conveyed by al-Ghazālī, namely 
“‘ilm al-kalām as the knowledge used to defend the ahl al-sunnah creed and 
protect it from deviant sects by relying on the al-Qur’an and sunnah and using 
rational reasons (al-Ghazālī, 1309, 6-7). Al-Taftāzānī stated that ‘ilm al-kalām is 
one of the rationalistic shari‘ah sciences which covers the main points of Islamic 
faith and plays a role in defending it from various other different views and 
ideologies (al-Taftāzānī, 1957, 3). 
From the various formulations above, both those that emphasize ontology, 
epistemology, and axiology, it is understandable that Islamic theology as one of 
the Islamic disciplines is built on a fairly strong foundation. From the review of 
science’s philosophy, the ontological aspects or objects that become the study of 
Islamic theology are God, apostleship, nature, and God’s relationship with His 
creatures. Meanwhile, from the epistemological or methodological aspects, 
Islamic theology uses religious thinking by placing revelation as the primary 
source and reason as a secondary source. Therefore, the process departs from 
the belief in the truth of God’s revelation, and reason functions as an 
explanatory or reinforcing tool (Nasution, 93). The existence of ‘ilm al-kalām or 
Islamic theology in Islamic scholarship is a fact which shows the creative 
thinking of the scholars to face the realities of society in the early development 
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of Islam. The condition at that time required the scholars to think critically. This 
is because they are faced with the need to rationalize the creed principles due to 
the influence of Greek thought that began to develop in the Muslim world. For 
this reason, it is natural that transcendent-speculative issues dominate the 
issues discussed by Islamic theology. 
 
Epistemology of Islamic Theology 
Islamic theology rests on an epistemological foundation that aims to 
respond to two philosophical questions that are commonly asked in all scientific 
disciplines. First, knowledge of what, and second, how to find out (Kartanegara, 
2000, 252-253). The two questions have their character. The first question is 
related to the object of study or the scope of Islamic theology’s discussion. The 
second question relates to the methods or tools used to obtain this knowledge. 
From the aspect of the object of study, it is clear that Islamic theology discusses 
God’s issue. Thus, all problems that have to do with God become the discussion 
of Islamic theology, such as issues of God’s nature, God’s deeds, and God’s 
words. Besides, what is included in the discussion of Islamic theology is 
metaphysical issues such as life in the afterlife and those related to other Islamic 
creeds. 
From the source aspect, Islamic theology is very dependent on the authority 
of revelation (al-Qur’an and sunnah) (Watt, 1992, 74). The text of revelation is 
the first source or the main foothold of Islamic theology (Abdullah, 1999, 121). 
With high respect for texts existence, especially the al-Qur’an, despite the 
variety of methodologies to understand them, encouraging the emergence of the 
expression that states that mutakallimīn will always base their perspective on 
understanding the al-Qur’an (Murata, 2005, 385). The above statement provides 
an understanding that according to mutakallimīn, revelation is a truth that must 
be accepted muṭlaq (acceptance with īmāni), and should not be criticized 
(Abdullah, 200, 2). When taking the evidence from the al-Qur’an, the 
mutakallimīn will accept the truth of the al-Qur’an. They believe that the al-
Qur’an verses are God’s revelations. So, they accept them not because their 
contents coincide with reason but because of their position as God’s words 
(Dunya, 1968, 61). When applying it as an argument, the mutakallimīn’s 
acceptance of the al-Qur’an text as a truth is based more on belief and faith and 
is not bound by argumentative-rational considerations. 
The belief of Muslim theologians in the absolute truth of the al-Qur’an and 
making it the main reference in theological questions does not mean that they 
negate the role of reason. Intellect is seen as the power to gain knowledge and is 
also appreciated for its position and revelation (Nasution, 1986,12). Muslim 
theologians also believe that muthlak reason is necessary within the framework 
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of Islamic theology’s basic methodology. This view is shared by all schools of 
Islamic theology, even among the ahl al-sunnah salafiyyah (ahl al-hadīth), 
namely the school with the least amount of rationality recognizing that reason is 
one of the most important sources of knowledge (Zahrah, 1996, 227). Regarding 
the position and function of revelation and reason in Islamic theological 
thought, al-Ghazālī, in his book al-Iqtiṣād fī al-I‘tiqād explains that the two 
sources have an interdependent relationship (interdependent) and 
complementary (complementary). In this case, Al-Gazālī gave an example of the 
relationship between the eye and sunlight in the process of seeing an object (al-
Gazālī, 1972, 3). The eye can only see things if it is healthy, but even healthy eyes 
cannot see if there is no light hitting the object. This example, al-Ghazālī 
concluded that it would be very wrong for people to be sufficient in only one 
source between revelation and reason. To be content with one source only 
means a blind person. 
  
Islamic Theological Methodology and Framework 
Thinkers have different names to introduce the method of Islamic theology. 
Some call it the dialectical method (jadali), the method of reasoning (bayāni), 
and the method of faith (īmāni). The dialectical method (jadali) was introduced 
by Nusabeh (Nusabeh, 1996, 826-840), while al-Jābirī conveyed the method of 
reasoning (bayāni), and the method of faith (īmāni) is Ḥassan Ḥanafī’s view 
(Ḥanafī, 2003, 31). The three figures, with the terms, used respectively, try to 
present certain aspects of the building of Islamic theological methodology. 
Nevertheless, philosophically each of these terms can meet at a common point, 
namely the basic idea that the method of Islamic theology, regardless of what 
title is used, is highly dependent on the authority of the text (religious-
revelation), and still takes advantage of the important sense as a secondary 
source. All mutakallimīn still adhere to the leading source (aṣl) in the form of 
the al-Qur’anic text, either directly or indirectly, and are based on authentic 
narrations. The potential reason or ratio as a secondary source is directed to 
understand and strengthen what is explained in the al-Qur’an text (Muslih, 
2004, 204). Theologians make revelation and reason as sources, they cannot 
mutually deny each other but need each other (functionally complimentary). 
The intellectual work patterns used by theologians when dealing with 
theological questions are as follows: a. Search and, at the same time, find 
references that come from both the verses of the al-Qur’an and the authentic 
hadiths; b. When references to both the al-Qur’an and the hadith are found, 
their existence is immediately believed to be muthlak truth based on faith, and 
there is no doubt about it; c. Revelation texts that are believed to be true are 
then understood by using reason or reason. From the three steps above, it can 
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be understood that the method of thinking of Muslim theologians first relies on 
revelation and then uses reason to understand it. They give priority to the text of 
the al-Qur’an because it is a revelation from God that cannot be doubted the 
truth, not because it is under reason (Nasution, 91). This method by Ḥassan 
Ḥanafī is called the religious thinking method. This refers to the starting point 
from the revelation as a primary source, then strengthening by reason as a 
secondary source. This method of thinking is usually confronted with a 
philosophical method that promotes free thinking (Ḥanafī, 32). Therefore, it is 
not wrong to say that it is impossible to become an infidel by studying Islamic 
theology. The reason is, whatever the flow of Islamic theology, always uses the 
method of religious thinking. 
The method of religious thinking described above is very different from the 
thinking model applied in Islamic philosophy. The working pattern or 
methodology of the Muslim philosophers is first to study philosophy and refer to 
naṣ or revelation texts. In this case, they put reason or reason ahead of naṣ or 
revelation (Ḥanafī, 32). Therefore, for philosophers, if there is an agreement 
between the product of thought and the meaning of the al-Qur’an text, there is 
no problem that becomes a polemic. However, if there is a conflict between the 
product of thought and the text of the al-Qur’an, then the text must be given a 
metaphorical meaning (rationalized) so that it is compatible with reason. In the 
context of Islamic theology, there are two ways to obtain knowledge from 
revelation according to the framework of bayani reason. a. Using linguistic 
analysis in studying the editorial of the verses of the al-Qur’an. In this context, 
the understanding of the al-Qur’an verses is carried out based on the rules of the 
Arabic language, especially the science of nahwu and saraf; b. Using the analogy 
method (qiyas), which is known in Islamic theology as istidlāl. 
In the case of linguistic analysis, there are differences of opinion among 
theologians about the lafaz and the meaning of the verses of the al-Qur’an, 
whether a lafaz is given a sense in accordance with the context or the original 
meaning. According to the Mu‘tazilah group, lafaz or words are given 
importance based on their context. Meanwhile, according to the textualist ahl 
al-hadīth group, lafaz or words are given meaning based on their original 
purpose. The difference of opinion between the two groups is motivated by 
different points of view regarding the lafaz or the al-Qur’an text. According to 
ahl al-hadīth, lafaz or words in the al-Qur’an originally came from God, sent 
down to His Messenger to be conveyed to his people. Therefore, according to ahl 
al-hadīth, every word in the al-Qur’an must be preserved as the original, because 
a change in editorial will change the meaning. The opinion of ahl al-hadīth is 
following the basic assumption of Arabic reasoning in which the text gives birth 
to purpose, not meaning that consumes the text. Likewise, the science of 
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nahwu, born from this basic assumption, plays a role in protecting the text from 
possible deviations of meaning. As for Mu‘tazilah, a lafaz is not mutlaq in the 
sense that it depends on the human condition and the environment as a 
condition. 
Furthermore, in terms of the analogy method, it is similar to the qiyās 
method in uṣūl al-fiqh. However, the mutakallimīn prefer to use the term idtidlāl, 
which is more precisely called istidlāl bi al-shahīd ‘alā al-ghaib. The theologians 
interpret the word al-shahīd as a human being and their characteristics, while 
the word al-ghaib means God. Therefore, istidlāl means understanding God (al-
ghaib) through understanding humans and nature (al-shahīd) (Muslih, 210-211.). 
This method of thinking, according to ‘Alī Sāmī al-Nashār, is an original method 
from Islamic circles (al-Nashār, 1974, 110). Al-Ghazālī in his various works, also 
very strongly uses this method of thinking (Jahja, 1996, 184). The majority of 
mutakallimīn also prefer to call their method not qiyās, but istidlāl, which is 
reasoning against unseen knowledge based on external (material) phenomena 
or commonly referred to as i‘tibār. Some mutakallimīn views that this i’tibār 
method needs to be used as it applies to qiyās. They base on QS. al-Hashr / 59: 13, 
“So take the incident to become i‘tibār”; and also in Q.S. Ali ‘Imran/3: 13, “Verily 
in this there is ‘ibrah for those who have eyes or eyes of the heart.” The purpose 
of i‘tibār is to return something proportional to it, where it is named aṣl (origin) 
to which its comparative is returned likewise. The I’tibār that applies among 
mutakallimīn is a path from the known to the unknown or unknown, namely 
from the original law or asy-shahīd known to the branch law al-ghaib as 
something that is not yet known or knowledge of which is sought (al-Jābirī, 143). 
In Islamic theology, istidlāl is divided into four forms, each of which is a way or 
model of operation: 
a. Istidlāl, which is based on similarity in terms of designation (dalālah). For 
example, to know that God is All-Willing, God’s will is analogous to the 
empirical condition of man. When it is known that humans have an intention 
and action, God does too. Another example that Allah is Almighty through His 
deeds can also be analogous to humans capable of performing activities. The 
similarity between the concrete-empirical and the abstract is in the way of 
knowing decision making. Capability is logically ascertained because of the 
validity of the action. This method underlies knowledge of the attributes of God. 
b. Istidlāl, which is based on the equality of ‘illat. For example, it is impossible 
for God to do evil because His knowledge of it is drawn on the basis of the same 
reason or reason that humans also do not do bad things if they know evil deeds. 
This method is widely used by Mu‘tazilah, for example, for knowledge of Allah’s 
justice and for Ash‘ariyah to determine Allah’s nature in addition to the 
substance. 
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c. Istidlāl, which is based on the similarity that applies to the place of ‘illat, or 
based on similarity to something like’ ‘illat. On the one hand, the state of “will”, 
for example, can be known in a straightforward/axiomatic manner (no need for 
thought). It means that we have assigned attributes to the subject based on 
concrete facts with indications of the actions performed. On the other hand, we 
know the validity of assigning the same thing to the abstract (Allah) to draw 
conclusions by assigning these attributes or attributes that Allah has the most 
Will. 
d. Istidlāl, which is based on the understanding that unseen realities have a 
higher ontological status than empirical ones. In other words, this model points 
to the same conclusion that the concrete world (empiric) is considered more 
logical to apply to the abstract world (al-ghaib). In fiqh, it is called al-qiyās al-
awla. An example is this: when we know that we have to behave well because 
that is good, how much more so is God who knows. 
The line of thought model used in theology is deductive (Mudzhar, 2000, 27-
66, Abdullah, 221-244). This means that the mindset is very much determined by 
revelation as a major premise, departing from general axioms and ending in 
specific knowledge. This kind of mindset, by ‘Abid al-Jābirī called the mindset 
bayāniyyūn, not ‘irfāniyyūn, nor burhāniyūn (al-Jābirī, 1991, 143). Amin Abdullah 
said that the deductive line of thought used in Islamic theology was very similar 
to Plato’s model of thinking, the innate ideas in Plato’s deductive model were 
replaced by the verses of the Al-Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet 
Muḥammad (Abdullah, 221-244). In its application, deductive logic uses thinking 
tools in the form of syllogisms, the same as those used in Islamic philosophy, 
namely a method of drawing conclusions or knowledge-based on-premises, 
major and minor. However, there are differences between the two, especially in 
terms of the quality of the premise. In philosophy, what is made the major 
premise must be primary, correct, certain, and convincing after passing a 
rational test, either through verification or falsification (the dismantling of 
theories through facts), whereas in Islamic theology, the major premise is taken 
from something that is accepted. in general (opinions) from society or those 
derived and believed from religion without going through a rational test (Bakar, 
1997, 105-106). 
 
Various Types of Thinking in Islamic Theology 
Another reason that is also seen as the main factor that can trigger 
differences of opinion in formulating Islamic theology is the difference in 
principles from the method of thinking. This problem has even become one of 
the main themes in the study of Islamic theology and has even led to various 
theological schools’ birth (Muzani, ed., 1995, 7). In its history, the beginning of 
  Journal of Islamic Thought and Muslim Culture (JITMC), 2 (2), 2020|105 
 
the emergence of Islamic theology was always preceded by a building of 
thought. Then after the flow was able to survive in the arena of thought with its 
fanatical supporters, a character who systematized the structure of thought was 
born. At that time, Muslim theologians made controversial theological 
questions a topic of discussion and dialectic discourse, offering speculative 
evidence to defend their position. These discussions and dialectical discourses 
continued and developed during the Umayyad dynasty and achieved progress 
during the ‘Abbasid dynasty. 
In the discussion of Islamic theology, Mu‘tazilah has a more complex and 
perfect view in offering speculative evidence formulated during the first period 
of the ‘Abbasid dynasty, to be precise, after contact with Greek thought. 
Mu‘tazilah figures who are quite famous are Abū al-Ḥuzail al-Allaf (135-235 H / 
752849 AD) and al-Nazzam (185-221 H / 801-835 AD). Meanwhile, the Ash‘ariyah 
founded by Abū Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī (873-935 AD), is seen as a traditional school. As 
a result of developing the method of thinking in solving theological problems, 
several school categorizations emerged, as follows (Ansari, 1984, 92). 
a. Anthropocentric Flow; anthropocentric theologians consider the essence of 
transcendent reality to be intracosmic and impersonal. It is closely related to the 
cosmos, both natural and supernatural elements, and humans are children of 
the cosmos. The supernatural element in man is the source of his strength. The 
human task is to let go of the evil natural ingredients. Thus, humans must be 
able to erase their human personality to gain independence from their natural 
bonds. People belonging to this group have a negative view of the world because 
they think their safety lies in their ability to get rid of all their desires and 
desires. Anthropocentric humans are very dynamic because they consider 
transcendent, intracosmic, and impersonal realities to come to humans in the 
form of power since they are born. The power is in the way of potential that 
makes it able to distinguish between good and evil. 
b. Theocentric School; theologians who adhere to the theocentric school believe 
that the essence of transcendence is supra cosmic, personal, and divine. God is 
the creator of everything in this universe, and with all His power, God can do 
anything absolutely. Humans are His creatures, so they must do only for Him. In 
this relative condition, the human self is an immortal migrant who will soon 
return to God. For that, man must be able to increase harmony with the 
ultimate and transcendent reality through piety. With his piety, humans will get 
the perfection they deserve, according to their nature. With that perfection, too, 
humans will become ideal figures who can radiate divine attributes in their 
mirror. This kind of condition will eventually save his fate in the future. 
Theocentric man is a static individual because he is often trapped in absolute 
submission. 
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c. Convergence or synthesis flow; convergence theologians hold the view that 
the essence of a transcendent reality is supra and, at the same time, intracosmic, 
personal, and impersonal. The existence of lāhūt and nāsūt, God and being, 
compassionate and evil, perishing and immortal, and other dichotomous 
qualities is the reason for this flow of convergence. Ibn ‘Arabī refers to these 
dichotomic traits with the term insijām al-azāli (preestablished harmony). This 
flow views that the whole cosmos, including humans, is a reflection and 
disclosure of asma’ and mutlaq relativity (‘Arabī, tt., 22). This school believes 
that the essence of human power is a process of cooperation between 
transcendental (God) forces in the form of wisdom and temporal (human) 
power in a technical form. As a result, when human power does not participate 
in the process of events that occur to him, it is the transcendental power that 
processes an event that happens to him. Therefore, he received no reward or 
torment from God. On the other hand, when an event occurs in man, while he 
has tried to do it, there is harmonious cooperation between the transcendental 
and temporal forces. Consequently, humans will get reward or torment from 
God, as much as their temporal contribution in actualizing certain events. Thus, 
the profane freedom of the human will always coexist with determinism. 
d. The Nihilist School; nihilist theologians believe that the essence of a 
transcendental reality is only an illusion. Even this school rejects a muthlak God, 
and only accepts various variations of the cosmos God. According to this school, 
humans are only specks of mechanism in a completely coincidental cosmic 
body. Strength lies in our intelligence to make the best of the worst offer. For 
this reason, ideally, humans have physical happiness, which is the central point 
of human struggle (‘Arabi, tt., 22). It can be understood that all theological 
schools in Islam, both Mu‘tazilah, Ash‘ariyyah, and Maturidiyyah, all have their 
thinking methods to solve theological problems that develop among Muslims. 
The difference that appears is only in the portion played by reason in solving 
these theological problems. Mu‘tazilah group argues that reason has very strong 
power so that it can establish a law. Meanwhile, the Ash‘ariyyah group claims 
that reason has weak power. Also, in terms of holding on to revelation, the 
differences that arise between Islamic theological schools are only differences in 
the interpretation of the al-Qur’anic text and hadith, not in their acceptance as a 
source of Islamic theological teachings. It is the differences in performance that 
give rise to various currents in Islamic theology. 
 
Application of Tafakkur in the Debate of Islamic Theology 
Truth claims are commonplace in every school of Islamic theology. The goal 
is good, namely, for the sake of an obsession with monotheism God. Therefore, 
all schools consider that the theological teachings they develop are the most 
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appropriate to affirm God. From the issue of tawhīd, the debate between Islamic 
theological schools has developed into many problems. Each school of Islamic 
theology has a different understanding of the divine problem and other 
problems related to it, raising arguments to defend their respective groups. In 
this paper, only three kinds of contentious issues are discussed, namely: 
a. Problems of Intellect and Revelation 
Some questions about reason and revelation, namely the extent to which 
human reason’s ability to know God and the obligations that God has imposed 
on humans? And to what extent is the function of revelation in explaining these 
two things? The word sense (‘aql) is the maṣdar form of’ aqala, which means to 
use reason. The word ‘aqala in the form of fi‘il (verb) means habasa, which 
means binding or captivating (Manzur, 1978, 485). A person who uses his mind 
is called ‘aqil (one who can bind and hold his lust). The meaning of reason, 
according to Muḥammad ‘Abduh is a force that only humans have, and 
therefore, differentiates humans from animals (Faris, 1979, 325). The word 
“revelation” comes from Arabic, namely al-wahy, which means sound, fire, and 
speed. Also, the word revelation also means whispers, signs, writings, and books. 
Furthermore, it also implies notification secretly and quickly. In terms of terms, 
revelation means hidden notification and is carried out very quickly. However, 
the word al-wahy is better known as the meaning of what God conveyed to the 
prophets and apostles. 
The problem of the ability of reason and the function of revelation in Islamic 
theology is related to two main problems, namely: The first is about 
ma‘rifatullāh (knowing Allah). This problem also relates to ḥuṣūl al-ma‘rifah 
(the process of knowing Allah) and wujūb ma‘rifat Allāh (obligation to know 
Allah). The second is about al-ḥusn wa al-qubhu (good and evil). This problem 
also relates to ma‘rifah al-husn wa al-qubhu (how to know good and evil) and 
wujūb i‘tināq al-ḥasan wa ijtināb al-qabīh (obligation to do good and stay away 
from bad). Then, which of the four problems in the area of reason, and which is 
the area of revelation? Various opinions and arguments emerged from multiple 
schools of Islamic theology. Ash‘ariyyah, argues that all obligations imposed on 
humans can only be known through revelation and not through reason. In this 
case, reason cannot make something obligatory, nor can it know what is right 
and what is bad, because goodness is acceptable according to the Shari’ah, not 
according to reason and bad. Therefore, humans cannot know that they must do 
good and stay away from bad (‘Abduh, 11). Reason can indeed know God, but the 
obligation to know God must be established by revelation. Likewise, actions that 
bring rewards and sins can only be known through revelation. Although the 
Ash‘ariyyah gives a high appreciation for the position of reason, in dealing with 
problems that contradict the opinion of reason and revelation, it prioritizes 
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revelation (‘Abduh, 11). 
Unlike the opinion of the Ash‘ariyyah group, for the Mu‘tazilah, reason can 
know everything. Even basis is obliged to know the existence of God even 
without any information from revelation. One of the important figures of 
Mu‘tazilah Abū al-Ḥuzayl emphasized that before Allah sent revelation, humans 
had an obligation to know God by reason. Likewise, the opinions of other 
Mu‘tazilah figures, such as al-Nazzam and al-Jubba’i (Nasution, 80-81). 
Regarding good and bad, Mu‘tazilah also argues that reason has high power 
given by God to humans. This is a form of God’s justice and as a facility given to 
humans to distinguish between good and bad and do good and stay away from 
bad. Good and bad are natural (pure) that can be known by reason. Religion, 
through revelation, is unable to change the essence of good and evil. If religion 
denounces something bad, it is because badness is something despicable, and if 
religion encourages goodness, it is because goodness is a laudable thing. Not the 
other way around; something is not immediately good or bad because religion 
orders or prohibits it. Therefore, humans are obliged to do good and stay away 
from bad. In this matter, Mu‘tazilah adopted the doctrine of rationalism from 
one of Yuḥanna al-Dimasyqi’s disciples named Thabit bin Qurrah, who was so 
persistent in proving Christian doctrine using pure logic. Based on this doctrine, 
Mu‘tazilah voiced the famous slogan “al-fikr qabla al-sam’i (logic before 
revelation) (al-Syamali, 1978, 196-197). As for the al-Maturidiyyah group, which 
was pioneered by Abū Manūur al-Maturidī in its theological thinking, it was 
heavily influenced by Imam Abū Ḥanīfah lot of ratio in his religious views. In 
matters of reason and revelation, al-Maturidiyyah argues that reason can know 
the obligations imposed on humans (Nasution, 76). Allah’s commands and 
prohibitions are closely related to the nature of an act, while the rewards and 
punishments depend on the nature of the act. Thus, the reason knows that 
doing good is good and doing evil is bad. This knowledge of reason further 
strengthens the existence of Allah’s commands and prohibitions. Even so, al-
Maturidiyyah did not explain whether it is obligatory to do good and leave evil 
before the revelation (Nasution, 76). 
b. The Issue of Big Sins, Faith and Kufr 
There are many arguments in the al-Qur’an that explain the division 
between big sins and minor sins. Among them are in the Q.S. al-Nisā’/4: 31, 
which means: “If you stay away from big sins that are forbidden to you, We will 
surely forgive your mistakes (small sins), then We will put you in a glorious 
place (heaven)”. Responding to the problem of sin, the scholars of the 
Ash‘ariyyah group agree that the sins that have been committed can be erased 
by tawbat al-naṣūha (sincere repentance). Also, they also agree that people who 
justify immorality or deny an obligation established by religion are classified as 
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kafir. According to the Khawārij group, carrying out religious orders, as stated in 
the al-Qur’an, such as praying, fasting, being honest, and upholding justice, are 
part of faith. They argue that faith is not enough just conviction in the heart and 
speech, but must be proven by deeds. Therefore, Khawārij classified as kafir 
people who believed in Allah’s oneness and the apostleship of the Prophet 
Muḥammad but did not carry out Allah’s commands and prohibitions. 
One of the most notorious subsects of Khawārij, Azariqah, uses a term 
heavier than the term kafir by referring to the “idolaters” of people outside their 
class. As for the perpetrators of grave sins, according to Azariqah, their faith has 
changed to kafir millah, namely leaving Islam, and the punishment is eternal in 
hell. Likewise, the Najdah subsection is extreme, calling “musyrik” for 
perpetrators of minor sins, and calling “kafir” for perpetrators of major sins that 
are not committed continuously. Thus, the meeting point between the two 
subsects is that a person who commits a grave sin means losing his faith and 
therefore becomes an infidel (‘Imarah, 2007, 308). However, the Khawārij 
subsect is classified as moderate, namely ‘Ibādiyah, which argues that the 
perpetrator of grave sins remains as muwāhid (one who affirms Allah), but is not 
a believer. The perpetrator of grave sin is still called an infidel even though he is 
only a blessed kafir (denying Allah’s favor), not an infidel millah. The torments 
they will receive in the afterlife are eternal in hell with other unbelievers (Rozak 
and Anwar, 2000, 143). The Murji’ah group is of the view that matters of faith 
and disbelief are matters of the heart. There is a famous slogan from the 
Murji’ah group: sin means nothing as long as there is faith, and kufr means 
nothing as long as there is obedience. In this case, they judge that faith is the 
belief in Allah and His Messenger, so whoever makes a vow in his heart with the 
word shahādat, it is sufficient to include him in the ranks of those who believe 
even though he claims to be an infidel, he is worshiping an idol. And even die in 
that state. 
The Mu‘tazilah group’s opinions about faith and infidels were strongly 
influenced by their uṣul al-khamsah (five basic pillars), namely: al-‘adl, al-
tawhīd, al-wa’du wa al-wa’īd, al-manzilah bayn al-manzilatain, al-amr bi al-
ma‘rūf wa al-nahyu ‘an al-munkar (‘Imarah, 2010, 649,650). Based on the concept 
of al-uṣūl al-khamsah, especially al-wa’du wa al-wa’īd, Mu‘tazilah considers that 
faith is not enough just confession in the heart, but must be proven by deeds. In 
matters of faith, Mu‘tazilah agrees with Khawārij. Regarding the status of the 
perpetrator of grave sin, Mu‘tazilah disagrees with Khawārij’s view of being the 
perpetrator of grave sin and rejects the opinion of Murji’ah, who views the act of 
grave sin as not affect faith and also rejects the opinion of Ḥasan al-Basrī who 
says that the perpetrator of sin big is hypocritical. According to Mu‘tazilah, the 
perpetrators of major sins do not become infidels, nor do they become 
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hypocrites, but those who commit grave sins are wicked. The perpetrator of 
grave sin is between the unbelievers and the believers, and he is eternal in hell, 
but his torment is lower than the suffering of unbelievers (‘Imarah, 2010, 
649,650). 
Furthermore, Abū Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī’s views on the issue of faith and kafir are 
relatively difficult to understand. Because in his works such as the books of 
Maqālāt, al-Ibānah, and al-Luma‘, al-Ash‘arī’s explanation of faith varies. In the 
Maqālāt and al-Ibānah books, al-Ash‘arī states that faith is qaulun and ‘amalun 
(words and deeds), and can increase and decrease. Meanwhile, in his book al-
Luma‘, he defines faith as taṣdīq bi Allāh (confirming the existence of Allah). Al-
Shahrastanī explained the definition of faith meant by al-Ash‘ari by quoting al-
Ash‘ary’s words as follows: “... faith is essentially taṣdīq bi al-qalb (justification by 
heart), while making a verbal pledge, and carrying out by deeds (iqrār bi al-lisān 
wa ‘amāl bi al-arkān) are only furu’ (branches) of faith. Therefore, anyone who 
acknowledges oneness and power and believes in the Prophet and Rasul as 
messengers of Allah, this kind of faith is true faith (sahih), and a person’s faith 
will not be lost unless he denies one of these two things”. Al-Shahrastanī’s 
explanation, besides combining the two different definitions in Maqālāt, al-
Ibānah and al-Luma‘ to one point, also places the three elements of faith (taṣdīq, 
qawl, and ‘amal) in their respective positions. Thus, for al-Ash‘ari and the 
Ash‘ariyyah group, the minimum requirement to be called a believer is taṣdīq 
(justification in the heart), which, if displayed in real terms, takes the form of 
pronouncing syahādatain (Razak and Anwar, 148, 149).  
Therefore, ma‘rifah and ‘amal are not part of faith. Humans can know 
ma‘rifah and ‘amal this only based on revelation. In other words, it is a 
revelation that explains to humans the obligation to know God, and humans 
must accept the truth of this news. The loss of something which is not a 
condition for the existence of a thing does not necessarily diminish its essence 
(‘Imarah, 183). It is a grave sin, it does not necessarily take away one’s faith, and 
it does not cause him to be kafir. Because in the view of Ash‘ariyyah, ‘amalun 
(deeds) is not a requirement of faith, but as a complement to faith, the level of 
one’s faith is not static, but dynamic according to one’s deeds. The al-
Maturidiyyah group has similarities with the Ash‘ariyyah in matters of faith and 
kafir. In cases of faith, the Bukhara al-Maturidiyah sect has the same ideology as 
the Ash‘ariyyah. Both of them thought that reason could not come to terms with 
knowing the existence of God. Therefore, faith cannot take the form of ma‘rifah 
or ‘amal (deeds) but must be tasdīq bi al-qalb wa al-lisān. Meanwhile, al-
Maturidiyyah Samarkand defines faith as tashdīq bi al-qalb, not merely iqrār bi 
al-lisān. What is spoken verbally in the form of a statement of faith will be void if 
the heart does not recognize verbally. However, according to him, tasdīq must 
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be obtained from ma‘rifah. The tasdīq that is produced from ma‘rifah is obtained 
through reason, not only through revelation. 
c. The Issue of God’s and Human Actions 
All schools of Islamic theology agree that God has deeds. This is seen as a 
logical consequence of Substance having the ability to do so. The problem is a 
human creation. In this case, several questions are discussed in Islamic theology, 
namely: who created human actions, whether God or man himself or both have 
a role? This question then broadens to raise other questions, does God have an 
obligation to do something or not, and are God’s actions limited to only good 
things or includes bad things? In answering some of the questions above, 
Mu‘tazilah, as a rational genre, argues that God’s actions are limited to only 
good things and do not do bad things. However, that does not mean God is 
incapable of doing evil deeds. God does not do bad deeds because He knows 
how bad they are. In the Al-Qur’an it is explained that God does not do wrong. 
The verses of the al-Qur’an that were used as guidelines by the Mu‘tazilah, 
among others, Q.S. al-Anbiya’/21: 23 which means: “He was not asked about what 
He did, and they will be asked.” 
Furthermore, what became a long debate was about the efforts that humans 
have to do something. Questions arise from various schools of Islamic theology, 
whether humans have the freedom to determine God moves their actions or 
humans in all their activities. This question has become one of the objects of 
discussion among Muslim theologians. Some groups argue that humans do not 
have the freedom to do something, and humans are like puppets moved by a 
puppeteer. This opinion comes from the Jabariyyah group. Some groups argue 
that humans have the freedom to act, so that good and bad actions are the will 
of humans themselves. This opinion comes from the Qadariyyah group. In this 
matter, the Mu‘tazilah group adheres to Qadariyyah ideology, which argues that 
humans can choose and freedom to do an action, even though their limitations 
determine human freedom. God empowers humans to do whatever they want, 
but God will reward them according to what they do (Nasution, 1986, 128). This 
view is formulated in al-’adl (God’s justice), one of the al-uṣūl al-khamsah (five 
basic teachings) Mu‘tazilah. God is al-‘adl (fair), according to Mu‘tazilah is that 
God does not like damage, therefore does not interfere with human actions to 
do something terrible. Humans are free to do things according to their wishes 
with the potential given by God. His commandments are His desires, whereas 
His prohibitions are something He does not want. God is obliged to give His 
servants something good for all things, including the obligation to keep His 
promises, send the Messenger to deliver His message, provide sustenance, etc 
(al-Buti, 2008, 76). The concept of al-‘adl (justice) is the keyword for Mu‘tazilah 
to determine the obligation for God to do something. However, the 
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consequences of this opinion make God seem limited in His power. That is, 
God’s ability seems to be limited to things that are considered good and unable 
to do bad things (Razak and Anwar, 151). 
Unlike the Mu‘tazilah, the Ash‘ariyah groups follow the Jabariyyah concept, 
which states that humans do not have freedom in their actions, but all are 
moved by God. The argument they use is the word of Allah in Q.S. al-Saffat verse 
96, which means: “Whereas Allah created you and what you do.” Based on this 
verse, according to Ash‘ariyah, humans basically do not have the freedom to 
determine their actions. Human power is God’s power, and human movement is 
determined by God’s absolute will. Imam al-Ghazālī supported this opinion of 
the Ash‘ariyah group. The Maturidiyyah group is divided into two groups. 
Maturidiyyah Samarkand, who adheres to Qadariyyaah or free will, which was 
pioneered by al-Maturidi himself. Maturidiyyah Samarkand supports 
Mu‘tazilah, who argues that God does not have muthlak power in determining 
human actions. However, the freedom that is meant here is narrower than the 
understanding of Mu‘tazilah, because according to Maturidiyyah Samarkand, 
God gives power to humans so that they can distinguish between good and bad. 
Another one is Maturidiyyah Bukhara led by al-Bazdawi. According to al-
Bazdawi, human actions are essentially God’s actions. According to him, what is 
called human action is majazi in nature, not essential, meaning that God’s will 
still overshadow the action (Razak and Anwar, 151). 
 
Conclusion 
From the above description, it can be understood that the thought process 
carried out by the kalam scholars has had a significant influence on the growth 
and development of Islamic theology. Theological schools are formed due to 
different thinking methods in explaining God, His oneness, His attributes, and 
other issues of creed. Each of the Islamic theological schools tries to strengthen 
their opinions with the verses of the al-Qur’an and hadiths. The arguments of 
the mind that have been cultivated by Greek philosophy and other civilizations 
have also played an important role in developing Islamic theology. 
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